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Recently, there has been a growing tendency to suggest “new” classes of wars that
are presumably different from all wars we have known and studied.  In this article,
we discuss the extent to which the landscape of armed conflict has changed so dra-
matically that it has necessitated a revision of the prevalent typology of war, a re-
consideration of the correlates of war, and a reconceptualization of the theoretical
assumptions regarding the etiology of war.  While it is clear that patterns of warfare
shift across time and space, it is not clear that war itself has changed “fundamen-
tally” and has become inexplicable in light of theoretical arguments in world poli-
tics as many “new war” theorists suggest.  Our analysis demonstrates that many of
the “new wars” are simply amalgamations of various interstate, extrastate, and intr-
astate wars—i.e., the “old wars”—that have been lumped into a single category.
The result is a hodgepodge of armed conflicts whose different correlates derive
from their diverse morphologies rather than their novelty as wars unlike any we
have experienced previously.
KEY WORDS: international wars, civil wars, new wars, peoples’ wars, postmodern wars
During the three decades since the inception of the Correlates of War (COW)
project, we have followed the conventional trichotomy of interstate, extrastate, and
intrastate wars, seeking to generalize about these three types of war, based as they
are on the political status of the protagonists.  In the past decade, however, there has
been a growing tendency to suggest “new” types of wars and to urge that these “new
wars” are quite unlike and appreciably different from all wars we have known and
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studied, and thus must be examined and described as a separate genus (e.g., Gray,
1997; Holsti, 1996, 1997; Kaldor, 1999; Rice, 1988).  This strikes us as both inaccu-
rate and inefficient and ignore the extensive similarities between the “new wars” and
those found in extant categories of war.  This could encourage a proliferation of quite
arbitrary categories of war requiring new variables, new operationalizations, etc.,
producing an odd and idiosyncratic typology that undermines cumulation and com-
parative testing of rival theoretical models.
One counter to the inefficiency critique is that the political phenomena that we
study in world politics are complicated, and this requires that one sacrifice efficiency
in order to adequately explain referent world phenomena.  However, with respect to
the novelty of the “new wars,” this argument must address the possibility that these
wars are adequately subsumed under extant categories of war and really are not “new”
at all.  We contend that “new wars” are actually an amalgam of different types of “old
wars” and that once we separately analyze the domestic and international wars that
constitute the “new war” categories, this will be quite clear.  Further, contrary to the
assertion of “new war” theorists, war has not changed “fundamentally,” with respect
to its “purpose,” types of participants, and the manner of its prosecution.
In this essay, we critically examine the claims of “new war” theorists.  First, we
review several “new war” arguments and discuss the alleged changes in warfare that
they argue have necessitated new classificatory schema.  Next we provide a closer
examination of the extent to which war has changed “fundamentally.”  Following
closely the criteria of the “new war” theorists themselves, we separately analyze the
international and domestic wars that comprise the “new war” categories in order to
determine the extent to which the “new wars” are actually the “old wars” given new
names.  The importance of comparing the “new” and “old” wars is that if it is found
that these are the same wars, then it is difficult to argue—as “new war” theorists
do—that the existence of “new wars” necessitates new categories of warfare and
novel theoretical explanations for their occurrence.  Finally, we recapitulate our main
argument and discuss its implications for future research on war in world politics.
“NEW WARS,” “POSTMODERN WARS,” “WARS OF THE THIRD
KIND,” AND “PEOPLES’ WARS”
The various “new war” theses rest on several common empirical claims.  First,
they argue that the locus of conflict in the world has shifted from Europe to postcolonial
regions.  Second, they suggest that conflict has shifted from disputes between states
to disputes within states.  Third, they maintain that these “new wars” are dissimilar
in purpose, practice, and (type of) participants from the “old wars”—such as the
interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars found in the COW typology—that have
been the major concern of scholars of world politics (see Small & Singer, 1982;
Reid-Sarkees, 2000); therefore, they constitute a novel form of war and necessitate a
novel theoretical explication of their etiology.  Fourth, they insist that since the etiol-
ogy of these wars is distinct from that of other types of wars, then the correlates of
these wars are likely to be much different from those of other wars, and, therefore,
“new wars” require different strategies to reduce their likelihood.
In order to substantiate these claims, “new war” scholars need to clearly demon-
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strate that their wars are “fundamentally” different from previous ones, and their task
should begin with a clear definition and delineation of these wars.  Having described
the “new wars,” they should propose theoretical arguments for their occurrence, and,
one would expect that the processes involved in these “new wars” would not be
common to the “old wars”—thus, the “newness” of the former.  Next, “new war”
theorists should systematically differentiate the correlates of their “new wars” from
those of the “old wars” to show how the processes that generate the former are not
identical to those that generate the latter.  This would provide powerful support for
their claims. Before we discuss the extent to which “new war” theorists provide such
evidence, it is necessary to get a better sense of what constitutes the “new wars,”
themselves.
In the sections that follow, we introduce the reader to four types of “new wars”
and the authors associated with theses related to each.  These include Kaldor’s “new
wars,” Gray’s “postmodern wars,” Rice’s “wars of the third kind,” and Holsti’s
“peoples’ wars.”  After a brief overview of the authors’ discussion of what consti-
tutes these wars, in the subsequent section, we review the theoretical arguments that
the authors use to explain their emergence and the authors suggested policies to
prevent them.  At the outset, it is important to point out that although we are quite
critical of the conclusions drawn by the various authors with respect to “new wars”
we also think that there is much that is useful in their analyses.  Moreover, we en-
courage critical inquiry into the manner by which we categorize armed conflict be-
cause such inquiry may allow us to refine or redefine extant typologies of war and
help us to generate more meaningful analyses of the factors leading to war and those
necessary for peace.  It is these concerns that guide the discussion that follows.
Kaldor’s “New Wars”
“New wars,” according to Kaldor (1999, p. 6) “can be contrasted with earlier
wars in term of their goals, the methods of warfare and how they are financed.”  For
her, these wars, which were prefigured in Mao’s insurgency in China (pp. 29–30)
and are exemplified by the recent war in Bosnia-Herzegovenia (p. 31), are rooted in
divergent claims to power based on “national, clan, religious or linguistic” character-
istics of groups (pp. 6, 76–79) in a context of simultaneous globalization and local-
ization and the “disintegration or erosion of modern state structures” (p. 78).  The
key role of identity in these wars seems to dictate that the objective of the belligerents
is “to control the population by getting rid of everyone of a different identity . . .
Hence the strategic goal of these wars is population expulsion through various means,
such as mass killing, forcible resettlement, as well as a range of political, psycho-
logical, and economic techniques of intimidation” (p. 8).  Participants in these wars
primarily employ guerrilla and counterinsurgency strategies (pp. 7–8), which aim
less at the physical control of territory through military advance than at the political
control of the population.  However, Kaldor (p. 8) asserts that “whereas guerrilla
warfare . . . aimed to capture ‘hearts and minds,’ the new warfare borrows from
counterinsurgency techniques of destabilization aimed at sowing ‘fear and hatred’.”
These wars are financed through a “globalized war economy” where the “fighting
units finance themselves through plunder and the black market or through external
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assistance” such as remittances from their diasporas, siphoning off of humanitarian
assistance, and/or support from third parties through illicit trade in arms, drugs, dia-
monds, and oil (p. 9).  Kaldor adds that “[a]ll of these sources can only be sustained
through continued violence so that a war logic is built into the functioning of the
economy” (p. 9).  Further, she maintains that this “retrograde set of social relation-
ships, which is entrenched by war, has a tendency to spread across borders through
refugees or organized crime or ethnic minorities (p. 9).  Therefore, although the
“new wars” primarily emerge from intrastate factors, they may swiftly metamor-
phose into interstate armed conflicts.
Gray’s “Postmodern Wars”
Kaldor is not alone in proffering a new category of war. Gray (1997, p. 158),
building on Jameson (1984) maintains that the Vietnam War was the first “postmodern
war.” Such wars are characterized by the use of computer-assisted weapons technol-
ogy and especially computer-aided artificial intelligence among one or more of the
belligerents.  Gray (1997) notes that there have been many labels applied to this
“new class of wars” ranging from “permanent war,” “techno-war,” “cyber war,”
“hyperreal war,” “information war,” “neocortical war,” and “Third Wave war;” how-
ever, he insists that “[t]hough all of these labels have something to recommend them,
none do justice to the complexity and sweeping nature of war’s recent changes” (p.
22).  He settles on “postmodern war” as a label for “two good reasons.”  First, he
maintains that the “logic and culture of modern war changed significantly during
World War II” (p. 22).  Second, he maintains that since information is presumably
important to postmodernity in the arts, literature, economics, and philosophy, and
since information—and computers to process it—is now “ the single most signifi-
cant military factor” (p. 22), then “postmodern” as an appellation seems appropriate
as a label for these wars.
According to Gray (p. 247), these wars are marked by the increased role of
“technoscience.”  He’s not as focused on the participants of war or the role of cul-
tural identity and several other factors that are of concern to Kaldor, for example;
nevertheless, like Kaldor’s “new war,” “[p]ostmodern war depends on international
tension and the resulting arms race that keep weapons development at a maximum
and actual military conflict between major powers at a minimum” (p. 23).  This type
of warfare is exemplified by the Gulf War, in which the strategy and tactics of the
winning coalition were facilitated by sophisticated high-technology data generating
and information-processing equipment, and battlefield engagements often approxi-
mated a form of “cyberwar” where belligerents (primarily in the case of the UN
coalition) relied on high-technology “smart” weapons systems to engage the adver-
sary.
Rice’s “Wars of the Third Kind”
Other authors agree that the Vietnam War signaled the emergence of a new type of
war, but they do not emphasize the high-tech aspect of these armed conflicts. For
example, Rice (1988) focuses on the protracted, generally nonconventional, largely
intrastate wars that typified the armed conflicts raging throughout the postcolonial
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(third) world in the post-World War II era. He explains that although these conflicts
are usually labeled “guerrilla wars,” the term “is incompletely descriptive” because
“the reliance of the one side on guerrilla operations may be only partial; it may over
time gain the capacity to wage battles of position and maneuver; and its opponent
may attempt throughout the conflict to fight a conventional war” (p. 1).   Drawing on
this rationale, Rice concludes that “[a]ccordingly, a more appropriate designation for
such conflicts might be wars of the third kind ” [original emphasis].  These wars were
not prosecuted as the conventional wars of eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe
(wars of the first kind) or in the manner expected of nuclear wars (wars of the second
kind).
Rice’s “wars of the third kind” are limited to predominantly rural Third World
states.  He maintains that “[i]t is in the rural areas of the underdeveloped lands of the
so-called Third World, and only in such lands, that wars of the third kind take place”
(p. 51).  He asserts that “wars of the third kind” have occurred in Afghanistan, Burma,
China, Vietnam, Cambodia, Malaya, the Philippines, Algeria, Ethiopia, Angola, Cuba,
El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, and that “what each country had [in com-
mon] was an underdeveloped and predominantly rural economy.”  The “radicalized
initiatives” pursued by the insurgents to achieve their political ends arise in such
countries because only a rural environment provides the supportive context for the
insurgent guerrilla force (p. 53).  Although nationalism is often a motivation for
insurgency (p. 78), Rice insists that where the problems facing predominantly rural
third world states are “fundamental,” then initiatives “that have been defeated or
suppressed are likely to reemerge and . . . become radicalized” and provide the raison
d’être for “wars of the third kind” (p. 51).
Holsti’s “Peoples’ Wars”
Rice’s (1988) observations became the point of departure for Holsti’s (1996) analy-
sis of post-World War II armed conflicts in the former colonial world.  In his study,
Holsti provides a more detailed empirical and theoretical analysis of “wars of the
third kind,” which he calls “peoples’ wars” (p. 28).1  For Holsti, “peoples’ wars” are
demonstrably different in their manner of prosecution, the types of participants in-
volved, and their purpose(s) as compared to the conventional institutionalized wars
that preoccupied Europe in the eighteenth and nineteenth century, or even the total
warfare that emerged first with the Napoleonic Wars and reached its zenith with the
two world wars of the twentieth century.  Whereas institutionalized warfare con-
sisted largely of limited campaigns “fought by centrally controlled, permanent, full-
time professional armed forces in the service of the state” (p. 29), “peoples’ wars”
are primarily guerilla campaigns fought by militarized communal groups against
either government forces or other militarized groups within the states (pp. 36–38).
In institutionalized warfare, Holsti avers, there was a recognition of certain “rules of
the game” such as the modalities of tactical engagement and norms on the treatment
of noncombatants.  In “peoples’ wars,” the line between combatant and noncomba-
tant is blurred if not completely wiped away, as members of rival communal groups
are targeted out of fear that their membership may be a source of potential power for
their rivals.2  Holsti adds that “[i]n eighteenth-century wars, very few had a stake in
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outcomes.  The ‘sport of princes’ was played in far-off fields.  In wars of the third
kind, the deadly game is played in every home, church, government office, school,
highway, and village” (p. 39).
“Peoples’ wars” are also distinguished from the total wars epitomized by the highly
institutionalized wars of mass destruction of the previous century (i.e., World War I,
World War II).  The latter were primarily interstate wars where there were clear
fronts and demarcations between soldiers and civilians, while in “peoples’ war,” Holsti
(p. 36)—borrowing heavily from Van Creveld (1991)—argues, “there are no fronts,
no campaigns, no bases, no uniforms, no publicly displayed honors, no points d’appui,
and no respect for the territorial limits of states.”   These wars are often described as
wars of national liberation or national unification and often have secession,
irredentism, or decolonization as their objectives.
While the list of “new wars,” “postmodern wars,” “wars of the third kind,” and
“peoples’ wars,” does not include every category of “new and distinct forms of war”
promulgated in the recent literature, the studies reviewed here give one the sense of
the type of categorization schemes being promoted to varying degrees.3 Interest-
ingly, after discussing the need for new categories of war, most of the authors fail to
delineate the cases that fall under the rubric of the respective “new war.”  For ex-
ample, Rice discusses several potential “wars of the third kind” in a list that is clearly
not meant to be exhaustive.  Kaldor primarily focuses on the conflict in Bosnia-
Herzegovina rather than providing a clear delineation of the cases of “new wars,”
and Gray does not furnish a list of postmodern wars at all.  Only Holsti provides a list
of all the candidate “peoples’ wars.”  Nevertheless, these authors maintain that with
the advent of these new wars, the nature of warfare has changed fundamentally,
leaving scholars without a useful theoretical explanation to account for this new
phenomenon.  For these theorists, it is not simply the “newness” of the wars that
make them so problematic, but the resulting lack of an explanation to account for
them that makes them potentially so intractable.
For example, Holsti (p. 25) claims that the “trends and patterns” of warfare since
1945 “cannot be explained by the standard theoretical devices of international poli-
tics, particularly by neo-realist analysis.”  Similarly, although Rice (1998) is con-
cerned with the need to adapt U.S. strategy to adequately respond to “wars of the
third kind,” the clear implication of his argument is that these wars are appreciably
different from those usually addressed in previous studies of war.  Gray (1997) is less
concerned with strategy than Rice, but he is even more emphatic that “postmodern
wars” are distinct from other types of war and he insists that “continuing illusions
about the nature of war itself bedevil any attempts to bring it under control” (p. 23).
Kaldor’s (1999) view also resembles those of other “new war” scholars with respect
to the inability of extant models of international conflict to explicate her “new wars.”
She suggests a need for “a new type of analysis” of war because of the “deficiencies
of inherited ways of perceiving . . . war” (p. 32).
To be sure, each of these theorists is correct that the phenomenon of war in the
post-World War II era has changed with respect to the locus of war and the preva-
lence of intrastate over interstate war; however, we take issue with their assertion
that the armed conflicts on which they focus constitute new and distinct forms of
war.  We also disagree with their assumption that these “new wars” are inexplicable
E. A. HENDERSON AND J. D. SINGER
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using extant approaches in world politics.  In the next section, we provide support for
these contentions.
ARE NEW WARS EXPLICABLE USING EXTANT THEORETICAL
APPROACHES IN WORLD POLITICS?
Holsti (1996) maintains that the neorealist emphasis on systemic rather than state-
level variables in accounting for the etiology of war is not applicable to “peoples’
wars.”  He is emphatic that “there is little remaining in the traditional literatures of
security studies specifically and international politics more generally that has ana-
lytical value for understanding or explaining the persistence” of these wars (pp. 206–
207).  According to him, this is largely due to the fact that these wars do not arise
from system-level variables but from factors internal to Third World states.  Holsti is
correct that many postcolonial armed conflicts seem to emerge from internal rather
than external factors (Ayoob, 1995; Luard, 1989; Henderson & Singer, 2000) and
that theoretical arguments in the international relations (IR) literature that focus largely
on the interaction between states may offer little by way of explanation of wars that
originate within states.  However, this critique is rather self serving since neorealists—
and realists, more generally—self-consciously focus their analyses on the explica-
tion of international phenomena; therefore, it is neither surprising nor inconsistent
that their approach(es) would not be as useful in accounting for processes or out-
comes that are primarily domestic in nature.  Nevertheless, even realist models, such
as power parity, and idealist thesis, such as the democratic peace proposition, have
been systematically—and arguably, successfully—applied to domestic conflicts (see
Benson & Kugler, 1998; Hegre et al., 1997).  Moreover, Snow (1999, pp. 105–106)
argues that civil wars during the Cold War era were readily explained using realist
precepts.  So even on this point, Holsti’s “new war” thesis is overstated at best.
Although we share the critique of the ethical, empirical, and epistemological
myopia of a fair share of Eurocentric scholarship in world politics in general (e.g. see
Henderson, 1995; Singer, 1996), actually the more appropriate target for this aspect
of Holsti’s critique is the comparative politics literature.  While world politics may
have little to say about intrastate wars, these conflicts fall squarely in the purview of
comparative politics, which has had much to say about them; therefore, critiques of
studies of such wars should address the comparative politics research on the subject.
But, neither Holsti, Kaldor, Gray, nor Rice challenges this literature; instead, Holsti
culls his theoretical argument on the etiology of “peoples’ wars” from the compara-
tive politics literature.  In fact, the explanation of “peoples’ wars” that he proffers,
which is quite consistent with those put forward by Kaldor, Gray, and Rice (see
below), is a well-traveled explanation of civil war that focuses on conflict related to
the simultaneous challenges of state building and nation building (see Cohen et al.,
1981; Mullins, 1987; Henderson, 1999a).  One implication of this apparent theoreti-
cal convergence among ostensibly different types of wars (i.e., “peoples’ wars” and
civil wars in postcolonial regions) is that “peoples’ wars” are similar in etiology to
these civil wars because that is largely what they are:  civil wars in the Third World,
rather than a new or distinct class of war (see below).
Similarly, Kaldor’s (1999) “new wars” seem to be largely coterminous with “low
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intensity conflict (LIC),” which is actually an amalgam of various types of smaller
scale interstate and intrastate armed conflict.  She recognizes as much but cautions
that “[a]lthough it is possible to trace the evolution of the new wars from the so-
called low-intensity conflicts of the Cold War period, they have distinctive charac-
teristics which are masked by what is in effect a catch-all term” (p. 2).  She asserts
that “new wars” largely reflect and have emerged in part from a “revolution in mili-
tary affairs” (RMA); however, for her—and similarly for Gray (1997)—this RMA is
not simply a revolution in the technology of warfare, which has generated new strat-
egies and/or tactics of warfare, but “a revolution in the social relations of warfare”
(p. 3).  The centerpiece of this revolution has been the globalization of world politics
evident in the greater interconnectedness of societies as a result of advanced infor-
mation technologies and improvements in communications and data processing.  This
changed context has provided for the privatization of violence wherein “[t]he vari-
ous political/military factions plunder the assets of ordinary people as well as the
remnants of the state and cream off external assistance destined for the victims, in a
way that is only possible in conditions of war or near war.  In other words, war
provides a legitimation for various criminal forms of private aggrandizement while
at the same time these are necessary sources of revenue in order to sustain the war.
The warring parties need more or less permanent conflict both to reproduce their
positions of power and for access to resources” (p. 110).
Stripped of their lexical veneer, Kaldor’s “new wars” are not much different from
the LICs from which she admits they derive.  General John Galvin’s (1992, p. 60)
conceptualization of low intensity conflict as “a kind of warfare we have known
about since the beginning of human history, but we still tend to think of it as some-
thing new,” reminds us of the basic problem in Kaldor’s analysis.  Galvin (p. 60)
maintains that “[i]n the immediate future we will see the same causes of low-inten-
sity conflict we have found in the past, including weak national administrations, lack
of political infrastructure, economic stagnation, historic problems of disfranchise-
ment for large parts of the citizenry, corruption and mismanagement, and difficult
military–civil relationships.” This description appears to be almost identical to
Kaldor’s; however, Galvin’s focus is on the terrorist, guerilla, and other intrastate
and interstate armed conflicts that are evident throughout the last few hundred years
and have been the mainstays of studies of war within comparative and world politics.
These are not new wars at all.
In addition, the causes of Kaldor’s “new wars” are found in the same “weak state”
structures that Rice (1988, p. 53) implicates in his “wars of the third kind” and that
Holsti (1996, pp. 82, 130–143) implicates in his “peoples’ wars.”  She is explicit that
“[t]he new wars occur in situations in which state revenues decline because of the
decline of the economy as well as the spread of criminality, corruption, and ineffi-
ciency, violence is increasingly privatized both as a result of growing organized crime
and the emergence of paramilitary groups, and political legitimacy is disappearing”
(p. 5).  Her solution, “the reconstruction of legitimacy” (p. 114), dovetails with Holsti’s
call for vertical and horizontal legitimacy within “strong state” structures as a deter-
rent to “peoples’ wars.”  Kaldor also advocates “cosmopolitanism” or a “positive
political vision, embracing tolerance, multiculturalism, civility and democracy,” as
well as “a more legalist respect for certain overriding universal principles which
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should guide political communities” to deter “new wars” (pp. 115–116).  This is
quite similar to Holsti’s call for democracy, stronger state structures, and regional
development and integration initiatives as policies to deter “peoples’ wars.” It is
quite interesting that “new wars,” “wars of the third kind,” and “peoples’ wars” all
seem to call for the same type of solutions that many scholars—since Woodrow
Wilson in this case—have called for to resolve the “old wars.”  Therefore, while
Holsti may be correct that neorealist arguments have great difficulty accounting for—
and preventing—these “new wars,” it appears that Wilsonian idealist precepts are
clearly relevant in explicating them.
Turning to Gray’s (1997) “postmodern wars,” these are largely a subset of Kaldor’s
LICs that are marked by the increased salience of high-tech weaponry in their execu-
tion.  In fact, Kaldor (1999, p. 2) admits that before settling on “new wars” as a label
she considered the appellation “postmodern” to describe her newly discovered armed
conflicts because, in one sense, she thought it might be “a more appropriate term.”
Nevertheless, she was dissuaded because the “term [postmodern] is also used to
refer to virtual wars and wars in cyberspace” while she stated that “the new wars
involve elements of pre-modernity and modernity as well.”  For Gray, however, the
impact of technology on both our conception of war and our willingness and ability
to wage war is a defining characteristic of his new type of war, “postmodern war.”
He argues that “postmodern war” largely results from the impact of
“technoscience,” which “calls war into question (war will destroy the world) and
simultaneously provides the rationales for continuing it (war can now be managed;
war can be fought between bloodless machines)” (p. 247).  Moreover, he suggests
that “[p]ostmodern war exists because it has managed to deploy a specific and lim-
ited definition of rationality and science as an institution to replace valor . . . The
values are those of lethality . . . and low casualties for ‘our side’” (pp. 247–248).  In
addition, he maintains that “[h]igh-tech weapons, especially nuclear weapons, have
also shifted the discourse of war in some crucial ways—freezing out world war and
total industrial war, except in the budgets and imaginations of the armies of the world,
and fostering dreams of painless ‘surgical’ LICs” (p. 247).  According to him,
“postmodern war is now framed through computer metaphors and weapons as a
manageable contest of intelligent machines in cyberspace, making it a much less
horrible prospect.  So, in spite of the invention and the use of the most incredible
inhuman weapons, the danger and reality of horrible wars remains at the same ex-
traordinary level that it has since 1939” (p. 252).
A closer look at Gray’s (1997) prescription for the prevention of “postmodern
wars” reveals that—beyond the “postmodernist” verbiage—it is really little different
from the prescriptions offered in a more straightforward way by Holsti, Kaldor, and
Rice.  For example, Gray (1997) calls for more open and transparent decision mak-
ing to check the “technophilia” that makes palatable the awful destructive capacity
of modern high-tech weapons by depersonalizing war (i.e., the “cyborgization” of
war).  For him, the prevention of “postmodern wars” requires the “deconstruction”
of our concepts of war through the empowerment of “subjugated knowledges,” which
can then be used to construct “regimes of truths” that will provide the basis for a
new—and hopefully, more humane—discourse on war (p. 256).  Some may argue
that these types of “solutions” provide the best evidence for why postmodernist ap-
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proaches are best left to interpretations of the subtext of pieces of literature rather
than applied to the substantive requirements for peace in our constructed, though
nonetheless, very violent world.  The relevance of “postmodern” world politics, not-
withstanding, such a dismissive view misses the point that Gray’s (1997) prescrip-
tion for preventing “postmodern wars” is largely a call for the same type of political
legitimacy that Kaldor, Rice, and Holsti demand.
To be sure, Gray emphasizes the more subjective elements of the legitimacy con-
struct instead of focusing on the state structures necessary to insure political legiti-
macy, which would, in turn, recognize the “subjugated knowledges” that should shape
the discourse on war (and peace) and inform policy.   These “subjugated
knowledges”—and their relationship to changes in technology—have been refer-
enced quite readily (though communicated much differently) since the writings of
Karl Marx, Karl Mannheim, W. E. B. Dubois, and Anna J. Cooper, among many
others.  What is distinctive in the present era, for Gray, is not the existence of “subju-
gated knowledges” or their relationship to the dominant paradigms and practices of
politico-military elites, but the extent of the destructiveness of present technology as
well as the degree of detachment from war that such technology affords its user.
Therefore, in the present era, “technophilia,”—unobstructed by the “subjugated
knowledges” that can provide a counter to militaristic pursuits—risks the destruc-
tion of humankind.  Nevertheless, the open discourses required for the postmodernist
engagement that Gray favors requires open and legitimate political systems because
he realizes that “[p]ostmodern war is first of all, and last of all, a political issue” (p.
251).  It follows, then, that similar types of legitimate state structures that Kaldor,
Rice, and Holsti insist deter their “new and distinct” wars also prevent Gray’s
“postmodern wars”— again, indicating that “new wars” are clearly not inexplicable
through extant approaches in world politics, but explanations of their etiology and
prevention are quite consistent with Wilsonian idealist precepts.
Our review of the theoretical arguments on the factors that give rise to—and pre-
vent—the putative “new wars” lead us to the conclusion that these wars are little
different in etiology from those that comprise the locus of armed conflicts captured
in extant categories of war.  Further, we contend that the “newness” of these wars
largely derives from the fact that they are a hodgepodge of several types of war (i.e.
interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars) whose distinctiveness as a category derives
from the diverse morphologies of its constituent wars rather than its novelty as a
“new and distinct” form of war.  After creating this typological hodge-podge, “new
war” theorists exclaim that IR theory can not account for the “new wars.”4
It is important to demonstrate that our concerns with these new categories of war
does not derive from any “academic imperialism” on our part aimed at stifling the
promulgation of new typologies.  Instead, our concerns derive from a serious consid-
eration of the claims of these authors in light of what for them appears to be a “fun-
damental” change in warfare.  Therefore, in the next section, we’ll use the criteria of
the “new war” theorists themselves to show how warfare has not changed “funda-
mentally.”  Specifically, we’ll utilize the criteria provided by Holsti, who is the most
systematic of the “new war” theorists, to determine the extent to which war has
changed fundamentally. Also, it’s necessary to focus on Holsti’s analysis because it
is the most theoretically developed and detailed examination of the “new wars” pro-
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vided by the authors examined in this study.  In this way, we are less likely to be
viewed as using our own selective criteria to reject a thesis that we apparently dis-
agree with.
HAS WAR CHANGED “FUNDAMENTALLY”?
Holsti (1996) maintains that “peoples’ wars” are different from conventional or
total wars with respect to the types of participants, their patterns of prosecution, and
their purpose(s).  He makes it clear that “when two or more of these criteria change
fundamentally, we can say that there has been a transformation of war” (p. 27).  Since
he asserts that his peoples’ wars evince such changed characteristics, one may infer
that these wars constitute a new form of war, although Holsti does not use the term
“new war” explicitly.  Using Holsti’s criteria, let’s examine the extent to which war
has changed “fundamentally.”
Have the Types of Participants in Wars Changed?
As noted above, many of the ostensible “peoples’ wars” that Holsti focuses on are
primarily—though not exclusively—civil wars that have occurred in Third World
states.  Holsti’s view that the types of participants in wars have changed ignores the
fact that today, as in the past, civil wars are fought by the armed forces of states and
those of insurgents ranging from amorphous dissident groups to highly organized
militias and rebel armies.  Moreover, he adds that “peoples’ wars” are characterized
by a blurring of the historic distinction between the soldier/combatant and the civil-
ian/noncombatant, creating “a fundamentally different nexus between combatants
and civilians” as compared to earlier wars (p. 39).  Military historian Geoffrey Parker
(1995, p. 369) agrees that “[i]n the wars fought in Europe during the nineteenth and
earlier twentieth centuries between 70 and 80 per cent of the casualties were military.
By contrast, since 1945, the majority of the approximately fifty million people killed
in war have been civilians—rising to 70 per cent in Vietnam.”  The operative phrase
in Parker’s statement is “wars fought in Europe.”  When we examine the ratio of
civilian to military deaths in the imperialist wars of the nineteenth century fought
outside of Europe we find patterns of high civilian-to-military casualty rates that
Holsti would have us believe are exclusive to these very recent “wars of the third
kind.”
For example, Karnow (1989, p. 194) notes that in the Second Philippines War of
1899-1902—one of the United States’ imperialist wars—4,000 U.S. troops were killed,
20,000 insurrectos, and roughly 200,000 civilians.  This almost 10 to 1 ratio of civil-
ian to military deaths in this “old war”—with civilian deaths representing 89% of the
total—surpasses that of even the prototypal “peoples’ war,” the Vietnam War.  More-
over, there is the long history of armed conflicts fought to secure Africans for Euro-
American enslavement, as well as the colonial wars in Africa and Asia, which rou-
tinely targeted civilians.  The absence of focus on these conflicts reflects an underly-
ing problem in Holsti’s formulation, which is its Eurocentric orientation, wherein
changes in warfare in Europe are taken as representing changes in warfare in gen-
eral.  For instance, in his discussion of the transformation to total war, he points out
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that “eighteenth- and twentieth-century European wars share little in common” (p.
35) and he uses this as a basis for his claim that warfare changed “fundamentally”
across these eras.  Although he briefly mentions the distinction between European
practices on the continent and those away from it (e.g., p. 34), he largely ignores the
evolution of warfare in other areas, which is ironic since he often claims that the
problem with many theorists is their “Eurocentric” focus (e.g., see Holsti, 1992).  In
sum, even a cursory review of the full range of international and domestic wars of
the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries—to include imperialist wars—cautions against
accepting Holsti’s conclusions that his “new wars” evince higher civilian to military
fatality rates than the “old wars.”5
Have the Patterns of Prosecution of Wars Changed?
Holsti maintains that the patterns of prosecution of the “new wars” are dramati-
cally different from those of previous wars, with “peoples’ wars” marked by the use
of guerilla warfare strategies rather than the more conventional strategies of earlier
eras (p. 38).  But Holsti’s view that guerilla warfare is a hallmark of his “new” wars
ignores the prevalence of this type of warfare in the “old” wars.  Parker (1995) ob-
serves that guerilla warfare has been employed in many of the “old wars,” such as
the U.S. War of Independence, the Napoleonic Wars, the U.S. Civil War, the Franco-
Prussian War, the Boer War, and World War II.  Moreover, even a single war is often
prosecuted using a combination of strategies and tactics.  For example, the battles of
the Napoleonic Wars were not only typified by the set-piece encounters such as oc-
curred at Austerlitz, but also by the guerilla engagements in the Peninsula War (it is
from this conflict that we get the term “guerilla war”).  In addition, the U.S. War of
Independence was fought not only in conventional battles, but also by the guerilla
forces of Francis Marion (the “Swamp Fox”) and Nathaniel Greene.  So much is
Francis Marion associated with guerilla warfare that the US Army Ranger Handbook
records him as one of the forerunners of the Rangers—who are experts in unconven-
tional warfare.  Of General Greene, Parker (1995, p. 190) states that he “combined
regular forces with guerilla bands to exhaust and defeat an enemy in a way that
foreshadowed the tactics of twentieth-century wars of national liberation…[o]ne
hundred years later Mao Tse Tung echoed Greene’s tactics.”
In fact, “wars of the third kind,” which are often viewed as guerilla wars, often
involve conventional strategies as well, making it difficult to simply label them as
“guerilla wars” and to argue on that basis that they are “fundamentally” different
from “conventional” or “institutionalized” wars.6  For example, Mao’s “people’s war”
strategy is not simply a “guerilla warfare” strategy but one that proceeds through
several stages, culminating in a three-stage protracted war strategy that emphasizes
hit-and-run guerilla attacks, assaults by larger mobile columns utilizing a maneuver
strategy, and finally set-piece conventional offensives.  In practice, both Mao and Ho
Chi Minh modified this approach and viewed guerillas as essential throughout the
protracted war stage; nevertheless, it should be clear that “people’s war” is not syn-
onymous with “guerilla war.”  Lomperis (1996, p. 331) notes that leading North
Vietnamese military strategists, particularly General Giap and Party Secretary Le
Duan, “professed their deep loyalties throughout their careers” to a strategy of people’s
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war; however, he insists that “[i]t is not . . . the strategy that they used to gain their
victory.”  He adds that the North Vietnamese had abandoned a people’s war ap-
proach shortly after the Tet Offensive of 1968 and there followed a period of search-
ing for an alternative strategy.  They used a conventional strategy in the failed Easter
Offensive of 1972 and also used a conventional strategy in the successful Ho Chi
Minh campaign of 1975 that felled Saigon.  In Africa, one of the most protracted and
destructive “peoples’ wars” has occurred in Angola; nevertheless, Arnold (1995, p.
375) reminds us that the battle of Cuito Cuanavale in 1988 was “one of the largest
conventional military clashes in Africa” [emphasis added].
Holsti (1996) also argues that the transformation in the prosecution of warfare has
led to the increased lethality of “peoples’ wars.”  For example, he states that “[c]asualty
figures are a grim indicator of the transformation of armed conflict represented by
wars of the “third kind” (p. 37).  However, the apparent increased trend in the fre-
quency, magnitude, or intensity of civil war over the last two centuries—ostensibly
culminating in the more destructive peoples’ wars of the post World War II era— is
largely the product of the increase in the number of states over the past two centuries
(from 23 in 1816 to 155 in 1980).  When the system is normalized to account for the
number of states, we find that there is an absence of a trend in either the frequency,
magnitude, or intensity of civil wars from 1816–1980 (Small and Singer, 1980, Chapter
16).  These findings are hardly surprising when we remember that some of the most
severe civil wars in the last two centuries were the “old wars” of the nineteenth
century; in fact, the 20,000,000 battle deaths in the Tai’ping Rebellion of 1860–1864
have never been even remotely approached by the “peoples’ wars” of the post-World
War II era.  Therefore, Holsti’s view that civil wars in the post-World War II era have
been more frequent and more severe as compared to those occurring in other eras
appears to be incorrect.   The degree to which the patterns of prosecution of the “new
wars” are dramatically different from previous wars is an empirical issue that should
be systematically demonstrated before one claims that wars have changed “funda-
mentally.”  Holsti does not provide such a demonstration, relying instead on anec-
dote, allusion, and a liberal ransacking of history, to make a case that is easily chal-
lenged and clearly requires much more systematic and reliable evidence.7
Has the Purpose(s) of War Changed?
The final factor that Holsti discusses to show how war has changed fundamen-
tally focuses on the “purpose” of war.  He maintains that the “purpose” of war is
different in “peoples’ wars” than in other types of war.  Holsti’s argument presumes
that determining the purpose of war is not problematic and that we have a clear
understanding of the purpose of “old wars” that allows us to differentiate them from
the “new wars.”  This is hardly apparent.  In fact, one of the great difficulties faced
by analysts of war is uncovering the “purpose” of war.  For example, what was the
“purpose” of the protagonists in World War I or World War II, or the Vietnam War?
Was there only a single purpose, or several?  Moreover, whose “purpose” defines
“the purpose” of each respective war?  Even if we conceive of purpose in terms of
strategic objectives, what is clear from even a cursory review of the history of war-
fare in the last century is that objectives change and often there are as many distinct
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“objectives” in a war as there are participants (and often the participants themselves
are in dispute with decision makers on their own side as to what they are fighting
for—even more so when wars are fought, as they often are, by coalitions).  Although
Holsti (1991) has devoted some effort to determining the “purpose” of wars, his
analysis is highly idiosyncratic and impressionistic and relies far too much on his
personal judgment as to which factor(s) defined the “purpose” of each respective
war.  For example, Holsti’s (1991) cases from 1648–1991 range from wars with a
single “purpose” (e.g., the Second Balkan War) to those with as many as seven (e.g.,
the Anschluss).  Further, his lists include only the “issues for original combatants”
while ignoring the issues motivating third parties to become involved in the con-
flicts; strangely, in some cases, he only includes the “purpose” of one side in the
conflict as the “purpose” of the war (see Tables 3.1, 5.1, 7.1, 9.1, and 11.1).   In fact,
there is little more than Holsti’s reading of history to inform his evaluation of the
“purpose(s)” of war and it is these impressionistic and idiosyncratic suppositions
that he relies on to base his subsequent claims that war has changed “fundamen-
tally.”  When devising a typology, one is better served by utilizing criteria that allow
one to differentiate among the actors while leaving the objectives of the actors in the
conflict as an empirical issue to be uncovered through systematic analyses rather
than being embedded in the classificatory scheme itself.
For example, Vasquez (1993) argues that wars between states of very asymmetri-
cal capabilities are driven by a different decision-making logic than those of states
that are relatively balanced in terms of their capabilities.  He bases his typology of
war, in part, on this characteristic whereby wars involving states of asymmetrical
capabilities (i.e., wars of inequality) are differentiated from those in which the
belligerents are of approximate parity (i.e., wars of rivalry).  This typology does not
fall prey to the deficiencies of that proposed by Holsti.  In a more widely used clas-
sificatory scheme, the Correlates of War (COW) project’s typology of war is based
on the politico-legal characteristics of the participants involved (i.e., states or non-
state actors) rather than their military, economic, or demographic characteristics.  In
the COW approach, one can use the compiled data to determine the military, eco-
nomic, and demographic correlates of wars that the political entities engage in, with-
out assuming, a priori, that differences or similarities with respect to any of these
characteristics define the type of conflict.  Moreover, it does not pretend to capture
the “purpose” of the wars, but leaves that to analysts who utilize these data.  It is this
approach that has allowed the COW typology to become the most widely utilized
classificatory scheme in the scientific study of war and peace and that has made the
resultant COW data set, “the most thorough and influential quantitative data set on
war” (Vasquez, 1993, p. 25).
In sum, Holsti’s suggestion that war has changed “fundamentally” does not hold
up to close scrutiny even using his own criteria of what constitutes such change.
Having argued that the “new wars” are not appreciably different from the “old wars”
in terms of their participants, prosecution, and “purpose,” we turn our focus to pro-
viding support for our claim that “new wars” are simply a hodgepodge of the “old
wars.”  By disaggregating the different types of war obscured under the respective
“new war” rubrics, we should be able to further demonstrate the extent to which the
“new wars” are simply the “old wars” with different names.  Since Holsti (1996) is
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the only “new war” study to provide a detailed list of candidate wars, it is necessary
to focus on his study in our attempt to demonstrate that the “new wars” are basically
the “old wars,” after all.
DISTINGUISHING WARS AND THEIR CORRELATES: INTERSTATE
AND EXTRASTATE WARS
Types of War: The COW Project Categories
Interstate wars are the most studied form of international conflict in world politics
and they are most often defined, operationally, following COW criteria as sustained
combat between the regular armed forces of at least two recognized states wherein
the participants incur at least 1,000 battle deaths (Small and Singer, 1982).  COW
also provides a straightforward definition of extrastate wars as armed conflicts be-
tween states and nonstate political entities that incur 1,000 battle deaths a year, in-
cluding both imperial and colonial wars.   Lastly, intrastate wars include both inter-
communal and civil wars.  Whereas an intercommunal war is fought between two
groups  within the state (neither party being the government), a civil war is defined
as sustained military combat, resulting in at least 1,000 deaths per year, pitting cen-
tral government forces against an insurgent force capable of effective resistance,
determined by the latter’s ability to inflict upon the government forces at least 5% of
the fatalities that the insurgents sustain (Small and Singer, 1982, pp. 210–220). While
both interstate and extrastate wars are international wars, intercommunal and civil
wars are primarily domestic wars (with the exception of a special class of civil wars
that are joined by third party states, internationalized civil wars).
Comparing “New Wars” and “Old Wars”
As noted above, Holsti’s (1996) analysis—like those of other “new war” theo-
rists—conflates several distinct types of war under a single rubric.  From what we
can gather, Holsti’s (1996, pp. 26, 40) impressionistic codings and his narrative indi-
cates that—at minimum—the vast majority of the armed conflicts listed in the Ap-
pendix to his volume are “peoples’ wars”; however, a review of these “major armed
conflicts” reveals that most of them are the interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars
outlined in the COW project.  For example, the 177 armed conflicts from the end of
World War II to 1992 in Holsti’s (1996) list of “peoples’ wars” includes 21 of the 23
COW interstate wars (it does not include the Israeli–Egyptian War of Attrition or the
Sino-Vietnamese War of 1985–87), all 24 COW extrastate wars, and 71 of the 77
COW civil wars (it does not include the civil wars in Paraguay, 1947; Yemen Arab
Republic, 1948; Indonesia, 1953; Argentina, 1955; Algeria, 1962; and Romania, 1989).
That is, approximately 66% of Holsti’s (1996) “peoples’ wars” from the end of World
War II to 1992 (COW war data end in 1992) are the interstate, extrastate, and civil
wars that are common to studies of armed conflict in world politics.  Of the 75 re-
maining armed conflicts—the totals seem inconsistent because in 18 cases Holsti
(1996) observes a single armed conflict while COW records at least two (in the case
of Holsti’s coding of the armed conflict in Guatemala (1966–94), COW records three
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separate wars) and there are several cases where COW codes a single war while
Holsti codes several wars—these consist of interstate and extrastate conflicts that do
not attain the COW battle death threshold (e.g., the U.S. armed intervention of Grenada
in 1983) and domestic armed conflicts that do not attain the COW battle death threshold
or the criteria for effective resistance (e.g., the ongoing conflict in Egypt involving
armed religious factions and the government).  Holsti codes 28 of the remaining
conflicts as “irredentist or secessionist” and these are largely convergent with the
large-scale “ethnopolitical conflicts” found in the Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.
Combining these conflicts with those found in the COW lists, the result is that 144 of
the 177 armed conflicts in Holsti’s analysis—more than 80% of the total—consists
of extant types of international conflict.  The remaining conflicts are primarily the
LICs and the smaller scale “ethnopolitical conflicts,” such as those found in Gurr’s
(1994) research (e.g., the ongoing conflict in Northern Ireland).
So from where does one derive the “newness” of Holsti’s “peoples’ wars?”  Clearly
the COW wars, constituting as they do the “old wars” that “new war” theorists dis-
avow, cannot form the basis of the “new wars”; however, neither can Gurr’s
“ethnopolitical conflicts” since he maintains that these are not “new wars” at all.  In
fact, according to Gurr (1994), these conflicts have been occurring throughout the
post-World War II era—and likely, much earlier.  One may assert that the “newness”
of “peoples’ wars” derives from the characteristics of the remaining armed conflicts
in Holsti’s (1996) study after we delete both the COW project wars and Gurr’s
“ethnopolitical conflicts” from Holsti’s (1996) list—i.e., the LICs.  However, Holsti
(1996, pp. 37–40) acknowledges that his “peoples’ wars” or “wars of the third kind”
are extremely brutal and generate high numbers of casualties.  For instance, he states
that “[c]asualty figures are a grim indicator of the transformation of armed conflict
represented by wars of the ‘third kind’” (p. 37).  It follows that, to a large degree,
“peoples’ wars” must consist of the interstate, extrastate, and civil wars delineated in
COW, which are larger in scale due to the battle death criterion in the COW classifi-
cation schema, and the large-scale intercommunal conflicts found in Gurr (1994) (at
present, COW does not provide a list of intercommunal wars) and not the LICs that
remain on Holsti’s list of “armed conflicts” after the aforementioned wars are de-
leted.  However, as noted above, the wars from COW and Gurr (1994) are hardly
new at all.  In fact, they form the locus of wars that Holsti and others use as a baseline
from which to differentiate their “new wars.”  It is clear that while Holsti (1996)
declares that his “new wars” are distinct from “old” wars, he includes these “old
wars” in his list of “new wars.”  This makes it exceedingly difficult to argue that
“peoples’ wars” are “new and distinct” forms of war.
An alternative path for salvaging Holsti’s claims is the argument that the wars on
his list are somehow different in their correlates and etiologies from those on the
COW list.  Since “peoples’ wars” consist of interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars,
one would have to show that the correlates of each class of wars are different from
those of their counterparts among “peoples’ wars.”  That is, if one is to suggest that
“peoples’ wars” (and by implication, “new wars,” in general) are “new and distinct”
forms of war, then one would need to demonstrate that the interstate wars within the
“peoples’ war” category have different correlates than interstate wars as defined by
COW, and that extrastate wars within the “peoples’ wars” category have different
E. A. HENDERSON AND J. D. SINGER
181NEW WARS
correlates than extrastate wars as defined by COW, and that intrastate wars within
the “peoples’ wars” category have different correlates than intrastate wars as defined
by COW.  On the other hand, the failure to distinguish the correlates of “peoples’
wars” from those of extant types of war would tend to support the view that “peoples’
wars” are an amalgam of these other types of wars and do not represent a “new”
category of war requiring a “new” theoretical or analytical approach for their expli-
cation.
However, this research design path is not open to Holsti because roughly 66% of
his “peoples’ wars” are the identical wars found in COW and more than 80% are
those found in the combination of COW and the MAR datasets; therefore, the likeli-
hood that the corresponding interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars found among
these lists will have different correlates is exceedingly low.  To be sure, the correlates
of the “peoples’ wars” that are included among the COW interstate wars appear to be
quite compatible with the robust findings of prominent studies of interstate war in
world politics.  For example, none of the interstate “peoples’ wars” violated the demo-
cratic peace proposition.  Where there are likely to be differences in the correlates of
“peoples’ wars” and those of extant categories of wars are in those LICs that are
included in Holsti’s list (what COW classifies as militarized interstate disputes); how-
ever, for reasons stated above, the LICs cannot be used to constitute the core of the
“peoples’ wars” category.
Moreover, there is a bigger problem with Holsti’s (1996) analysis in that by com-
bining several categories of war under a single rubric he has made the additional
assumption that they have a common etiology (as evidenced by his theoretical argu-
ment on the causes of “peoples’ wars,” see below) and, therefore, they have common
correlates.  The point here is not that Holsti asserts that interstate wars on the COW
list share similar correlates with those on the “peoples’ war” list, but that Holsti
implies that the interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars that he includes in his
“peoples’ war” category—as a group—share common correlates.  It stands to reason
that the major justification for including these diverse types of war under a single
rubric is the assumption that they share common correlates and etiologies—i.e.,
Holsti’s alleged common “purpose” for these wars as compared to earlier wars; how-
ever, Holsti fails to empirically evaluate this seemingly clear implication of his
“peoples’ war” thesis.  Beginning with the two types of international wars (i.e., inter-
state and extrastate wars), let us examine the extent to which they share common
correlates and, therefore, justify Holsti’s inclusion of them in a single category of
war.
Interstate and Extrastate Wars
Although there is a dearth of systematic research on the correlates of extrastate
war, a recent analysis of the factors associated with the onset of interstate and extrastate
war from 1946–1992 reveals several similarities between these two classes of war
(Henderson, 2002).  For example, greater economic development (controlling for
major power status) is generally associated with a decreased likelihood of a state’s
involvement in both interstate and extrastate wars in the post-World War II era.  Simi-
larly, political transitions do not appear to be significantly associated with either
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interstate or extrastate wars.  In addition, during the post-World War II era, major
powers were more likely to be involved in both interstate and extrastate wars.  The
latter finding indicates, inter alia, that while the major powers enjoyed a “Long Peace”
among themselves where they were less likely to fight each other (especially after
the Korean War), they were hardly opposed to fighting nonmajor powers.  In addi-
tion, since extrastate wars have been primarily imperial or colonial armed conflicts,
it is not surprising that the major powers as a group were more likely to be involved
in these types of wars during the “Long Peace.”
While these findings suggest several similarities between interstate and extrastate
wars, there are even more striking dissimilarities between them.  For example, West-
ern states were no more or less likely to be involved in interstate wars in the post-
World War II period, but they were significantly more likely to be involved in extrastate
wars.  In fact, Western states fought the lion’s share of the most protracted and de-
structive extrastate wars (e.g., Indo-Chinese War, Malayan Rebellion, Algerian War,
Angolan War, Mozambican War, Guinea/Bissau War).  Another major difference
between the correlates of interstate and extrastate wars is that while democratic states
(again, controlling for major power status) were more likely to be involved in inter-
state war from 1946–1992, democracies were less likely to be involved in extrastate
war.  Moreover, while Western democracies were less likely to become involved in
interstate war, they were significantly more likely to be involved in extrastate wars.
The divergent relationships among the correlates of interstate and extrastate wars
in the post-World War II period in some ways may reflect the differences that Vasquez
(1993) associates with respect to the motivations behind “wars of rivalry” and “wars
of inequality.”  More directly, extrastate wars are often fought by protagonists, who
insist that a given territory (or people) should be incorporated into their state (or
empire), and their adversaries, who are often asserting a right to self-determination
and/or independence.  Therefore, the logic of decision making in extrastate wars
may be more similar to that found in secessionist-oriented civil wars than the realpolitik
logic that is assumed to guide decision making in interstate wars.  To be sure, in the
post-World War II era a very diverse group of imperialist powers usually made very
similar claims with regard to their “right” to their occupied or colonial territories and
they were willing to go to war to press these claims, as evidenced by the French in
Vietnam and Algeria; the British in Malaya and Kenya; the Portuguese in Mozambique,
Guinea-Bissau, and Angola; the Chinese in Tibet; and the Ethiopians in Eritrea.  We
are not claiming that extrastate wars are caused by the same factors that generate
civil wars, but we are pointing out that in some ways the decision-making logic used
in extrastate wars is similar to that which is assumed to prevail in civil wars as op-
posed to that which is assumed to prevail in interstate wars.  Regardless, the crux of
the matter is that the different correlates of interstate and extrastate wars militate
against subsuming them under a single rubric.
The differences in the correlates of interstate and extrastate wars probably reflect
larger differences in the etiologies of these two types of armed conflict and further
reinforces our view that “new war” theorists should not include these diverse types
of wars under a single rubric and then suggest that they represent a single, “new and
distinct” form of war.  However, “new war” theorists do not simply combine inter-
state and extrastate wars—which have different correlates—under a single rubric,
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they also combine these two distinct forms of war with civil and intercommunal
wars, which have even more distinct correlates and etiologies.  In the next section,
we discuss several problems associated with conflating civil wars and other types of
domestic armed conflict and review the implications for the arguments of “new war”
theorists.
DISTINGUISHING WARS AND THEIR CORRELATES: CIVIL WARS
Scholars have drawn clear distinctions between the correlates of civil wars and
other forms of domestic conflicts.  The difference in correlates is not surprising since
a civil war is distinct from other forms of domestic conflict in terms of the scale and
the objectives, the degree of coordination required for successful prosecution, and
the more protracted nature and level of destructiveness of civil war.  Gurr (1970, p.
334) encouraged scholars to distinguish among several forms of domestic violence,
and this view has been largely supported by the consistent findings that the correlates
of domestic conflict vary across different types (Boswell and Dixon, 1990; Gurr and
Duvall, 1973; Hardy, 1979).  For example, the presence of a democratic regime is
associated with an increased likelihood of protests but a decreased likelihood of re-
bellions (Gurr and Lichbach, 1979).  Similarly, while economic development re-
duces the likelihood of civil wars (Henderson and Singer, 2000) it appears to in-
crease the likelihood of lesser forms of domestic conflict such as protests, demon-
strations, strikes, etc. (Eichenberg et al., 1984; Gurr and Duvall, 1973).  Neverthe-
less, “new war” theorists conflate civil wars and smaller scale domestic conflicts
(which have different correlates) with extrastate and interstate wars (which also ap-
pear to have different correlates) into their single amorphous catchall category of
post-World War II armed conflict.
Importantly, civil wars comprise the largest number of any single class of armed
conflict in the post-World War II era, and a large portion of those conflicts catego-
rized as “peoples’ wars” (see Holsti 1996, pp. 210–224).  Nonetheless, of the few
large-n, longitudinal, data-based studies of civil wars, Henderson and Singer’s (2000)
study, which focuses exclusively on civil wars in postcolonial states, includes many
of Holsti’s “peoples’ wars.” The findings from this study may provide a baseline by
which to compare these civil wars with “peoples’ wars” in order to determine the
latter’s distinctiveness. The theoretical argument upon which they derive their em-
pirical findings assumes that postcolonial civil wars emerge largely from the failure
of states to respond effectively to the simultaneous challenges of state building and
nation building.  As noted above, this is an enduring argument in comparative poli-
tics and is the same argument put forth by Holsti to account for the etiology of “peoples’
wars” and is generally consistent with Kaldor’s and Rice’s arguments on the factors
that give rise to “new wars” and “wars of the third kind,” respectively.
The thesis suggests that European states had many decades—for some, centu-
ries—to develop effective institutions of governance and a domestic environment in
which the central government was the primary institution to which citizens swore
fealty.  Moreover, among European states, nation building followed state building;
therefore, European elites were able to address and resolve problems associated with
each sequentially.  In comparison, postcolonial states not only had a much shorter
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time horizon in which to build effective state structures and cohesive national iden-
tities, but they usually had to accomplish both simultaneously.  One result was that
postcolonial political elites faced a dilemma wherein by attempting to create strong
state institutions they generated domestic resistance that further reduced their ability
to effectively govern, since traditional leaders of the heterogeneous groups within
these societies customarily are not possessed of an overarching national identity that
recognizes the legitimacy of the central government, nor are they usually intent on
helping to establish institutions of governance that challenge their own traditional
authority.  In addition, although leaders of postcolonial states risk the disintegration
of their societies, they nonetheless have disincentives to providing institutional and
infrastructural development out of fear that political development might lead to the
political mobilization of disparate groups in their societies and the construction of
rival power centers that might threaten their incumbency.  Many of these elites, un-
able or unwilling to garner legitimacy from a disaffected, generally poor, usually
heterogeneous, and often disgruntled citizenry, turn to repression in order to ensure
the security of their individual regime while devoting resources to the military to
stave off insurgency.  The result for many postcolonial states is often the very insur-
gency that the governing elites’ policies were meant to deter.
The implication of Henderson and Singer’s (2000) findings for research on
“peoples’ wars” is that if “peoples’ wars” consist largely of postcolonial civil wars
and both emerge from the same process as suggested by the theoretical argument
outlined above, then maybe they are largely the same phenomenon. In addition, since
the theoretical argument on the etiology of “peoples’ wars” is identical to that used to
explain postcolonial civil wars, then it is not surprising that IR “theories” are hardly
applicable to these wars since—if the theoretical argument is correct—“peoples’ wars,”
by and large, emerge from domestic rather than international factors.
All told—like the extrastate and interstate wars included under the “peoples’ war”
rubric—the postcolonial civil wars included among the “peoples’ wars” do not con-
stitute a new type of armed conflict with distinct correlates and etiologies.  These
civil wars are quite explicable using extant theoretical arguments found in the com-
parative politics literature, and IR scholars should simply wed their theoretical argu-
ments on interstate phenomena with those pertinent to intrastate phenomena and not
propose new categories when it appears that the domestic and international twain
meet.  Having made our case with respect to interstate, extrastate, and civil wars, the
remaining portion of the large-scale armed conflicts in Holsti’s (1996) study consists
primarily of intercommunal conflicts; we now turn our focus to the latter.
DISTINGUISHING WARS AND THEIR CORRELATES:
INTERCOMMUNAL WARS
Just as with interstate, extrastate, and civil wars, it is important to compare both
the theoretical arguments and the ostensible correlates of intercommunal wars with
those of “peoples’ wars.”  For the most part, intercommunal wars are often catego-
rized as interethnic conflicts, and the theoretical arguments pertaining to them are
both extensive and diverse (Horowitz, 1985; Henderson, 1999b).  In addition, there
is a lingering debate regarding the categorization of armed conflicts as “ethnic con-
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flicts” as well as concern regarding the definition of interethnic or “ethnopolitical
conflict,” itself.  For example, many empirical analyses of ostensibly “ethnic” con-
flicts seem to assume, out of hand, the salience of cultural factors in these disputes
(see Henderson, 1997, pp. 650–655).  In addition, many of these analyses fail to
differentiate between armed conflicts that involve government forces on one side
(e.g., the Angolan Civil War) and those that do not (e.g., the intercommunal war in
Somalia).  Nevertheless, it is hoped that through an analysis of “interethnic con-
flicts,” which comprise at least a sizeable subset of intercommunal wars, we can
glean an appreciation of the correlates of the larger set of intercommunal wars in
order to determine their distinctiveness from “peoples’ wars.”  We are limited to this
alternative approach since there have been few, if any, large-n, data-based, system-
atic analyses that explicitly focus on intercommunal wars using the COW definition
of intercommunal warfare.
Most of the systematic empirical findings on the correlates of intercommunal
conflict focus on interethnic, or “ethnopolitical” conflict and draw on data from the
Minorities at Risk (MAR) project.  Gurr and Harff (1994, pp. 190) define ethno-
political groups as “ethnic groups that have organized to promote their common
interests,” and it is these groups that engage in “ethno-political conflict.”  There are
four types of ethno-political groups; among them, ethno-nationalists and communal
contenders are most often associated with conflict (the other two groups are
“ethnoclasses” and “indigenous peoples”).  While many factors drive “ethnopolitical
conflicts” (e.g., see Gurr and Moore, 1998), Gurr and Harff’s (1994) theoretical ar-
gument implicates discrimination, underdevelopment, and the absence of full-fledged
democracy as key variables leading to ethnopolitical violence.  The major empirical
findings of Gurr’s (1994) analysis of large-scale “ethnopolitical conflicts” generally
support this view.  In addition, his findings suggest that issues of state building and
nation building seem to be at the heart of these conflicts insofar as “contention for
state power among communal groups in the immediate aftermath of state formation,
revolution, and efforts to democratize autocratic regimes” are the main issues of the
fifty most serious “ethnopolitical conflicts” in the MAR data set.  This argument
dovetails with Posen’s (1993, pp. 328) thesis that in situations where ethnic groups
can not rely on the central government to provide protection, such as in regime transi-
tions, an ethnic security dilemma develops and increases the likelihood of intereth-
nic conflict.  For both Posen (1993) and Gurr (1994), political transitions are strongly
implicated in intercommunal conflict, and for Gurr, political transition is the major
culprit in large-scale “ethnopolitical conflicts.”
Interestingly, it appears that political transitions play, at best, a reduced role (Hegre
et al., 1997, p. 25), if any at all (Henderson and Singer, 2000) in civil wars.  These
competing findings remind us that important correlates of one type of domestic con-
flict (e.g., intercommunal conflict) may be less important in a different type of con-
flict (i.e., civil war).  On the other hand, Gurr’s (1994) findings seem to implicate
many of the factors that Holsti (1996) argues are important correlates of “peoples’
wars” such as regime type, political stability, and level of development; therefore,
just as in the case of extrastate, interstate, and civil wars, previously discussed, it
appears that the correlates of “peoples’ wars” are very similar to those of an extant
(though admittedly imprecise) category of armed conflict, in this case, interethnic or
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“ethnopolitical conflict.”  Again, it does not appear that “peoples’ wars” represent a
“new” form of war, but rather they are an amalgam of various types of war subsumed
under a single rubric, which is evident once we tease out the particular types of
conflict subsumed under the general category.
CONCLUSION
In sum, in this essay we have examined several arguments that suggest that there
are “new” types of wars that are inexplicable in light of extant models and “theories”
because their correlates and etiologies are so different from the “old” wars that have
preoccupied world politics scholarship.  While we concede that there are differences
in warfare today with regard to its modal form (i.e., intrastate war as opposed to
interstate war) and its predominant locus (i.e., outside of Europe as opposed to within
Europe), we suspect that the “new wars” are readily conceptualized using extant war
typologies.  Further, we have demonstrated that once one disaggregates the diverse
wars that are subsumed under the “new wars,” “postmodern wars,” “wars of the third
kind,” and “peoples’ wars” rubrics, we find that their correlates and etiologies are
quite similar to the extant class of war into which they are appropriately categorized.
Our analysis indicates that we should focus less on “novel” forms of war and
instead renew our efforts to more fully account for the interstate, extrastate, and
intrastate wars that continue to rage across our planet.  We also encourage our col-
leagues to turn their focus towards explicating the extrastate, civil, and intercommu-
nal wars that have been severely under-studied (in a systematic sense) in world poli-
tics.  It is hoped that such systematic research will allow us to better appreciate the
factors that give rise to these often increasingly frequent wars which have plagued
states over the last half-century, so that we can provide informed policies to reduce
the likelihood of their occurrence in the new millenium.
As an aside, we are reminded that just as our analysis of the correlates and etiol-
ogy of “new wars” draws our attention to the similarities and dissimilarities across
different classes of war, the discussion also leads us to a consideration of the extent
to which those similarities that do obtain suggest a theoretical convergence on the
causes of war.  This is partly owed to Holsti’s combining of extrastate, interstate, and
intrastate wars under the “peoples’ war” rubric.  Moreover, it derives from an appre-
ciation that Holsti, in particular, and “new war” theorists, in general, proffer a single
theoretical argument to account for what turns out as not a single category of conflict
but what is, in fact, a diverse amalgam of extrastate, interstate, and intrastate wars.
So in spite of the fact that Holsti’s analysis seems off the mark with respect to sug-
gesting a new category of war and although his intent was to suggest greater diver-
sity among classes of wars and theoretical explanations for their onset, it turns out
that his analysis may contribute to the streamlining of theoretical explanations for
war.  That is, in providing an explanation for the onset of what he thought was a new
type of war but what is actually an amalgam of various types of wars, Holsti may
have inadvertently suggested a unified theory of war.  However, in actuality, Holsti
has not provided such a unified theory but an internally focused theoretical model,
which due to its internal focus appears to account for postcolonial civil wars and
some intercommunal conflicts; however, the state-building/nation-building model
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seems to be less useful in explicating the interstate wars that have occurred in the
post-World War II era.8  Instead, since the interstate wars on the “peoples’ war” lists
consist primarily of those from the COW population, then it is more likely that the
correlates and etiologies of these wars are consistent with those uncovered by studies
that focus on interstate war.  That is, they are more readily explicated using extant
models of interstate war such as the democratic peace thesis, power parity, or ex-
pected utility models rather than by Holsti’s intrastate war model.
Finally, we do not wish to appear dogmatic or peculiarly attached to a single
typology of war.  In fact, there is not a consensus with regard to the present categori-
zation of armed conflict, and we hardly suggest that the COW typology is sacro-
sanct.  Also, as stated above, we think that there is much that is useful in the analyses
of Kaldor (1999), Gray (1997), Rice (1998), and Holsti (1996), and we encourage
the generation of meaningful categories of armed conflict that allow us to more ef-
fectively analyze the correlates of war; however, as should be evident from the pre-
vious discussion, we do not think that such categories should reflect anything less
than a rigorous and scientific engagement with the subject matter.  Ignoring such a
prescription, what is likely is the cumulation of categories of conflicts, rather than
cumulation in the scientific sense, with little hope for generalizations regarding the
correlates of war and even less hope for informed policy to prevent wars.
NOTES
1. Holsti (1996, p. 28) argues that “[s]ince 1648, war has been of three essentially different forms.  We
can call them “institutionalized war,” “total war,” and wars of the third kind, sometimes called “peoples’
wars.”
2. Holsti (p. 39), articulating a view that converges with Kaldor’s (1999) “new wars” and Gray’s (1997)
“postmodern wars,” insists that “[f]or groups and communities, their main strength lies in the civil
population; it is the main source of their manpower, logistical support, and intelligence.  But civilians
also become targets. Communities are often intermingled so that battle lines cut through cities, towns,
and neighborhoods.  To the extent that control over territory is a key value, civilian populations are the
objects of eviction, rape, massacres, and ‘ethnic cleansing.’”
3. Beyond these, probably one of the more notable “new wars” is Huntington’s (1996) “fault-line wars,”
which emerge from “clashes of civilizations.” But Huntington does not suggest a new category of
conflict, he only suggests the increased importance of cultural factors (i.e., civilizations) in the con-
flicts in the post-Cold War era.  For him, states remain the most important actors in world politics, and
“fault-line wars” are either interstate or intrastate wars.  His cultural analysis is an addendum to the
realist state-centered approach (i.e., cultural realism) that does not reject the usefulness of extant
typologies of armed conflict in explicating “fault line wars” (see Henderson and Tucker, 2001).
4. In fact, one would only expect to uncover generalizations among such a diverse array of armed con-
flicts if there were similar correlates of interstate, extrastate, and intrastate wars, and, by implication,
a unified theory of war—which is exactly what “new war theorists” seem to oppose.
5. “Peoples’ wars” are distinct in their targeting of civilians only if one ignores, inter alia, the record of
strategic and terror bombing of population centers as in World War II, the targeting of civilians through
blockades and unrestricted submarine warfare as in World War I, and similar targeting of civilian
populations as in the Japanese invasion of Nanking and the Nazi genocide.  In fairness to Holsti
(1996), he does discuss the targeting of civilians in “total wars” of the twentieth century (e.g., p. 35);
nevertheless, this observation does not prevent him from making claims that “the clear distinction
between (sic) the state, the armed forces, and the society that is the hallmark of institutionalized war
dissolves in ‘peoples war’” (p. 37). Also, his blanket claims such as “[w]ar in the twentieth century
was total” ignores the more limited conflicts that mark the century as well, from the two Balkan Wars
at the beginning of the century to the Falklands/Malvinas Islands War near the end.
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6. See Lomperis (1996, pp. 13–20) for a discussion of several strategies of revolutionary insurgency that
contain elements of guerilla warfare that are not “people’s wars” in the Marxist sense.
7. For a systematic analysis of the impact of different strategies on war outcomes, see Stam (1996).
8. For a systematic attempt to fuse state-building, intrastate war, and the interstate war, see Maoz (1989).
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